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On Treating Past and Present Scientific Theories Differently 
 
Abstract 
Scientific realists argue that present theories are more successful than past theories, so present 
theories will not be superseded by alternatives, even though past theories were superseded by 
alternatives. Alai (2016) objects that although present theories are more successful than past 
theories, they will be replaced by future theories, just as past theories were replaced by 
present theories. He contends, however, that past theories were partly true, and that present 
theories are largely true. I argue that Alai’s discrimination between past and present theories 
is subject to his own criticism against realists’ discriminations between past and present 
theories, and also subject to other criticisms that philosophers have raised against scientific 
realism and pessimism. 
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Rival participants in the scientific realism debate agree that present theories, such as the 
oxygen theory and the kinetic theory, are more successful than past theories, such as the 
phlogiston theory and the caloric theory, i.e., that present theories explain and predict more 
phenomena than past theories. They disagree, however, over whether we should treat past and 
present theories differently, and if so, over exactly how differently we should treat them.  
Some treat past and present theories differently. For example, Jarrett Leplin (1997: 
141), Gerald Doppelt (2007; 2011; 2013; 2014), Juha Saatsi (2009: 358), Michael Devitt 
(2011: 292), Ludwig Fahrbach (2011a; 2011b), and Seungbae Park (2011) argue that present 
theories are more successful than past theories, so present theories will not be superseded by 
alternatives, even though past theories were superseded by alternatives. Thus, they take past 
and present theories to be on different footings. 
Others, however, treat past and present theories similarly. For example, P. Kyle 
Stanford (2006: 45) and K. Brad Wray (2013: 4327) argue that present theories will be 
overthrown, just as past theories were overthrown, even if present theories are more 
successful than past theories. These philosophers make sophisticated arguments to show that 
the superiority of present theories does not make any difference to their fate.
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this paper, however, is not their arguments but Mario Alai’s (2016) position. 
Alai (2016) contends that present theories will be replaced by future theories, just as 
past theories were replaced by present theories. He, however, treats past and present theories 
differently, claiming that present theories are largely true whereas past theories were partly 
true. He raises brilliant objections to scientific realists’ discriminatory treatment of past and 
present theories. I reply that his brilliant criticisms also apply to his own position, and that his 
position is also vulnerable to criticisms that other philosophers have raised against scientific 
realism and pessimism. Thus, this paper aims to raise difficulties against Alai’s position, 
without committing either to scientific realism or antirealism. 
 
2. Discriminatory Treatment 
Doppelt asserts that the (approximate) truth of a present theory explains the success of a past 
theory. His idea is that by assuming that a present theory is true, we can understand how a 
past theory was successful. For example, by assuming that the theory of relativity is true, we 
can understand how Newtonian mechanics was successful: 
 
On the realist assumption that our best current theory – relativity physics – is true, we get a 
natural and realist explanation of the success of Newtonian mechanics, whether or not we 
identify true components or accurate mathematical structure in it. (Doppelt, 2011: 310) 
 
Doppelt explicitly states that we do not need to invoke the truth of some theoretical 
assumptions of past theories to explain how they were successful: 
 
We can draw on our best current theories in order to explain what outdated theories got right, 
and why they succeeded, without asserting the truth of any of their theoretical components, 
supposedly preserved in successful superseding theories. (Doppelt, 2013: 47-47) 
 
Doppelt makes the same claim in other papers (2011: 297; 2014: 274). In short, he remains 
neutral as to whether some theoretical assumptions of past theories were true, refusing to 
invoke their truth to explain how past theories were successful. 
Alai agrees with Doppelt, saying that “current physics explains Newton’s predictive 
successes” (2016: 12). He, however, disagrees with Doppelt on the following two counts. 
First, while Doppelt does not make a doxastic commitment to past theories, Alai does, 
asserting that they were partly true. In this regard, Alai follows selectivism, maintaining that 
some theoretical components of past theories were true, while Doppelt does not. Second, 
while Doppelt claims that there will, at most, be minor revisions to present theories, Alai 
claims that present theories will be “displaced by others” (2016: 20). In this regard, Alai also 
follows selectivism, arguing that scientific revolutions will drive out present theories, while 
Doppelt does not. 
Selectivism and pessimism are similar in that they both embed the uniformity principle 
(Hume, 1978: 89) that the future will resemble the past. The uniformity principle indicates 
that scientific revolutions will occur as they have in the past. The two doctrines are dissimilar 
in that selectivism takes it to be significant, while pessimism does not, that some theoretical 
constituents of past theories have been preserved in present theories. Thus, the distance 
between the two doctrines depends on how rich the preserved theoretical constituents are. 
The distance is short, if the preserved contents are slender. 
While Doppelt claims that present theories are approximately true, Alai claims that 
they are largely true. Unfortunately, Alai does not define ‘largely true,’ which is a new and 
important predicate. Nor does he say anything about how it relates to the old realist predicate 
‘approximately true.’ He, however, does say something about how it relates to another 
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predicate ‘partly true.’ He says that “past theories were partly but not completely true, and 
our theories are largely true, and to a larger degree, but still not completely true” (Alai, 2016: 
18). This sentence indicates that Alai takes the concept of large truth to be stronger than the 
concept of partial truth, i.e., he believes that a largely true statement is closer to the truth than 
a partly true statement. 
Alai grants that present theories are more successful than past theories, but claims that 
their superiority does not justify Doppelt’s assertion that present theories are approximately 
true, although it justifies his assertion that present theories are largely true. Is Alai right? My 
answer is that he is wrong. If the superiority of present theories does not justify Doppelt’s 
position, it does not justify Alai’s position either. There is no reason for thinking that it 
justifies the inference from the partial truth of past theories to the large truth of present 
theories, but that it does not justify the inference from no commitment of past theories to the 
approximate truth of present theories, or the inference from the partial truth of past theories to 
the approximate truth of present theories. This point will become clearer, once we consider 
how Florian Müller (2015), Wray (2008), and Mizrahi (2013) criticize realism. 
Müller (2015) claims that it is one thing for present theories to be more successful than 
past theories, but it is quite another for present theories to be true. Present theories, although 
more successful than past theories, might not have reached the level of success that warrants 
the realist belief that they are true. He says that it “is not at all obvious why science, or at 
least our current best theories, should have achieved a degree of success that warrants their 
truth” (2015: 406). Müller’s criticism can be recast to apply to Alai’s position: It is not clear 
whether present theories, although more successful than past theories, have reached the level 
of success that warrants Alai’s belief that they are largely true. It is one thing for present 
theories to be more successful than past theories; it is quite another for present theories to be 
largely true. 
Wray (2008: 323) and Mizrahi (2013) point out that there is a tremendous difference 
between being close to truth and being closer to truth than a competitor. Admittedly, the fact 
that present theories are more successful than past theories shows that present theories are 
more likely to be true than past theories, and/or that present theories are closer to truths than 
past theories. It does not show, however, that present theories are likely to be true, and/or that 
present theories are close to truths. To use an analogy, even if you are closer to Berlin than I 
am on a marathon race from Paris to Berlin, it does not follow that you are close to Berlin. 
After all, it might be that you are only a step ahead of me, and that both you and I are far 
from Berlin. Similarly, it is one thing for a present theory to be closer to the truth than a past 
theory; it is quite another for the present theory to be close to the truth. As a result, the realist 
inference from the falsity of past theories to the truth of present theories requires more than 
merely saying that present theories are more successful than past theories. Wray and 
Mizrahi’s criticism of realism can be reformulated so that it applies to Alai’s position: It is 
one thing for present theories to be closer to truths than past theories; it is quite another for 
them to be largely true. A leap is required to move from the partial truth of past theories to the 
large truth of present theories, just as a leap is required to move from no commitment of past 
theories to the (approximate) truth of present theories, or to move from the partial truth of 
past theories to the (approximate) truth of present theories. Alai’s leap, thus, requires doing 
more than merely saying that present theories are more successful than past theories, just as 
the realist leaps do.  
Let me now turn to Alai’s criticism against the realists’ inference that since present 
theories are more successful than past theories, present theories will not be abandoned, even 
though past theories were abandoned. Alai puts forward the following original argument 
against the realist inference: 
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The history of science witnessed many ruptures, or “revolutions”, and this is because nature 
itself, contrary to an ancient proverb, makes leaps and has ruptures: its workings are not the 
same at different scales or different locations in space or time. For instance, it is (roughly) 
deterministic at large scales, but indeterministic at small scales; the physical laws today are 
probably different from those a few instants after the Big Bang; entropy increases over time in 
the universe as a whole, but it may decrease in local areas or over short time spans. (2016: 16). 
 
In short, scientific revolutions will occur as they did due to the way the world is. Inherent in 
this pessimistic argument is the uniformity principle indicating that science will develop in 
the way it has developed. Without the uniformity principle, Alai’s pessimistic argument 
cannot get off the ground.  
Since Alai endorses the uniformity principle, however, he should believe that scientific 
revolutions will reveal that present theories are only partly true, not largely true, just as 
scientific revolutions revealed that past theories were only partly true. It is illegitimate to 
believe that present theories are largely true, although past theories were partly true, while at 
the same time embracing the uniformity principle. Alai might reply that science has been 
improving, so it is reasonable to believe that present theories are largely true, although past 
theories were partly true. This reply, however, would invite immediate objections from 
Doppelt and other realists. Doppelt would say that since science has been improving, present 
theories are (approximately) true, although past theories do not call for our doxastic 
commitment. Other realists would say that since science has been improving, present theories 
will not be thrown out, although past theories were thrown out, so present theories are 
(approximately) true. It is not clear on what grounds Alai could contend that the improvement 
of present theories over past theories justifies his inference, but not Doppelt’s inference or the 
other realists’ inference. 
 
3. Objections and Replies 
Alai might suggest that a largely true statement is close to a partly true statement and distant 
from an approximately true statement. In other words, there is only a small gap between 
partial and large truths, but a wide gap between large and approximate truths. So the 
superiority of present theories over past theories justifies his inference from the partial truth 
of past theories to the large truth of present theories, but does not justify the inference from 
no commitment of past theories to the approximate truth of present theories, nor the inference 
from the partial truth of past theories to the approximate truth of present theories. 
This semantic move to avoid my previous objections, however, would only aggravate 
Alai’s position. His new position would inherit all the problems of his old position. For 
example, even if there is only a small gap between partial and large truths, Alai still has the 
burden to show that unlike past theories, present theories have reached the degree of success 
that warrants his belief that they are largely true. It is still one thing for present theories to be 
more successful than past theories; it is quite another for them to be largely true. In short, 
Alai’s discriminatory treatment of past and present theories still cries out for justification.  
Alai might propose that present theories are largely true by the definition of ‘largely 
true,’ provided that past theories are partly true, and that present theories are more successful 
than past theories. That is, once these two conditions are met, the meaning of ‘largely true’ 
entitles us to assert that present theories are largely true.  
Such a semantic move, however, would only prod Doppelt and the other realists to 
make a similar move, i.e., to propose that present theories are approximately true by the 
definition of ‘approximately true,’ once the same two conditions are met. 
Moreover, if there is a wide gap between large and approximate truths, there would 
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also be a wide gap between Alai’s new position and realism. Thus, saying that present 
theories are largely true would amount to advancing a position that is close to pessimism and 
distant from realism. As a result, Alai’s new position would be coveted by pessimists, but not 
by realists.  
It is useful in this context to consider Stanford’s (2015: 876) objection to selectivism. 
He agrees with selectivists that some theoretical assumptions of past theories were true, but 
insists that past theories are radically distinct from present theories, so they do not deserve 
the realist predicate ‘approximately true.’ The disagreement between selectivists and 
pessimists “is simply a difference of style or taste in applying the expression ‘approximately 
true’ rather than a substantive disagreement between them” (Stanford, 2015: 876). In other 
words, no rational argumentation can resolve the dispute over whether we can attribute 
‘approximately true’ to past theories. In Stanford’s vein, we can also say that there is only a 
terminological difference between the position that present theories are partly true and the 
position that they are largely true, if there is a small gap between partial and large truths. 
Alai might also suggest that we should resist the realist belief that present theories are 
approximately true because “the history of science shows that sooner or later all theories are 
displaced by others” (Alai, 2016: 20). For this reason, we can believe that present theories are 
largely true, but not that they are approximately true. On this suggestion, the downfall of 
present theories is compatible with the position that they are largely true, but incompatible 
with the position that they are approximately true. 
This suggestion, however, faces the following two objections. First, Alai believes that 
past theories were partly true, but not largely true, because they were supplanted by present 
theories. It follows that he should also believe that present theories are partly true, but not 
largely true, because they will be supplanted by future theories. Why take different epistemic 
attitudes towards past and present theories? Thus, he again faces the burden of justifying his 
discriminatory treatment of past and present theories. 
Second, Alai’s bleak outlook on the history of science conflicts with some other 
philosophers’ bright outlook on the same history. Fahrbach (2011a: 148), Park (2011: 79), and 
Mizrahi (2013: 3220; 2015; forthcoming) observe that there are far more recent past theories 
than distant past theories. Distant past theories are such theories as the phlogiston theory, the 
caloric theory, and the ether theory. They were both accepted and rejected before the 
twentieth century. By contrast, recent past theories are such theories as the oxygen theory, the 
kinetic theory, and the special theory of relativity. They were accepted in the twentieth 
century and are still accepted in the early twenty-first century, so they are present theories as 
well as recent past theories. Given that the number of recent past theories is far greater than 
the number of distant past theories, a random selection of past theories should include mostly 
recent past theories. Mizrahi (2013: 3219-3220) executes random sampling on the population 
of past theories, demonstrating that most of the sample theories are recent past theories. Since 
most recent past theories are also present theories, most past theories have been stable in the 
history of science, contrary to what Alai contends.  
Even if we granted for the sake of argument that all past theories were refuted, we 
could still argue that it is entirely a separate issue whether present theories will be refuted. As 
Park (2016b; 2016c) argues at length, it is problematic to infer the demise of present theories 
from the demise of past theories. In this paper, I will only summarize how he criticizes the 
pessimistic induction. 
The pessimistic induction is built upon what Park (2016b) calls proportional 
pessimism, according to which the more past theories were discarded, the more likely it is 
that present theories will also be discarded, i.e., the strength of the pessimistic induction is 
directly proportional to the number of past theories. So the germ theory is more likely to be 
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abandoned than the miasma theory, which in turn was more likely to be abandoned than the 
humoral theory. But the germ theory is more successful than the miasma theory, which was in 
turn more successful than the humoral theory. How can T1 be more likely to be rejected than 
T2 when T1 is more successful than T2? The pessimistic induction collapses along with 
proportional pessimism.  
In addition, Park (2016c) argues that the pessimistic induction clashes with some 
scientific practices. In certain cases, scientists believe that they will succeed although they 
have failed repeatedly. Thomas Edison tried out different filament and gas combinations to 
get a working incandescent light. He is reputed to have said, “I have not failed. I’ve just 
found 10,000 ways that won’t work.” Implicit in his thinking was the disuniformity principle 
that the future will differ from the past. Scientists are invoking the disuniformity principle, 
whenever they try again after trials and errors. It follows that pessimists need to justify, rather 
than merely assume, the inference from the premise to the conclusion of the pessimistic 
induction. 
A referee suggests that Alai’s position is a plausible compromise between Doppelt’s 
position and pessimism, because it incorporates both past scientific revolutions and 
subsequent improvements to scientific theories. Alai is more cautious than Doppelt, but more 
optimistic than pessimists. 
The referee is right to say that Alai’s position lies in the middle between Doppelt’s 
position and pessimism. The referee’s observation, however, does not undermine my 
objection that Alai’s criticism against Doppelt’s position applies no less to his own position. 
Specifically, if the superiority of present theories over past theories does not entitle us to infer 
that present theories are approximately true, neither does it entitle us to infer that they are 
largely true.  
Another referee advances the following defense of Alai’s position. Alai rejects 
Doppelt’s discontinuity view that we are justified in believing that present theories are 
approximately true while making no doxastic commitment to past theories. Doppelt’s 
position cannot accommodate the fact that some theoretical posits of past theories have been 
preserved in present theories. 
Consider, however, that Alai treats past and present theories differently, taking the 
former and the latter to be partly and largely true, respectively. He believes that present 
theories are not partly true, but largely true, on the grounds that they are more successful than 
past theories. Doppelt and the other realists would retort that present theories are not largely 
true, but approximately true, because they are more successful than past theories. In addition, 
Alai’s observation that some posits of past theories were carried over to present theories can 
be accommodated not only by his position, but also by the alternative positions that both past 
and present theories are partly true, and that past and present theories are partly and 
approximately true, respectively. 
The referee also suggests that I should respond to Alai’s contention that “Doppelt’s 
proposal is a dead end: his discrimination between past and present theories is implausibly 
radical and running counter both the ideas of cumulativity of science and fallibilism; it cannot 
account for the success of past theories, nor for the failures of current theories; and rather 
than shutting the door to the PMI and MMT, it opens it wide” (Alai, 2016: 6). 
I disagree with Alai that Doppelt’s position runs counter to the idea of fallibilism. 
Given that no philosopher today embraces infallibilism on any matter of fact, we should 
interpret Doppelt’s position not as saying that present theories are definitely approximately 
true, but as saying that they are likely to be approximately true. It is uncharitable to interpret 
his position as implying that there is no possibility at all that present theories will turn out to 
be not even approximately true. The principle of charity applies not only to our interpretation 
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of Doppelt’s position, but also to our interpretation of Alai’s position. We should interpret 
Alai’s position not as saying that present theories are largely true, but as saying that they are 
likely to be largely true. It is uncharitable to interpret his position as implying that there is no 
possibility at all that present theories will turn out to be not even largely true.  
The referee also suggests that I should respond to Alai’s contention that “our evidence 
is not that our theories are the most successful in the whole history, but only in the whole 
history up to now; and part of this evidence is also that many past theories were the most 
successful in the whole history up to their time, and yet later recognized as false; so, the best 
global explanation of our evidence is rather that past theories were partly but not completely 
true, and our theories are largely true, and to a larger degree, but still not completely true” 
(Alai, 2016: 18).  
Let me make two critical comments on this sophisticated pessimistic induction. First, 
realism is compatible with Alai’s contention that many successful past theories were later 
recognized as false. After all, scientific realism does not assert that all successful present 
theories are true. It rather asserts that most successful present theories are true (Putnam, 1975: 
73; Devitt, 2011: 286). Consequently, pessimists need to show not that some successful 
present theories will be abandoned, but that all or most successful present theories will be 
abandoned. As mentioned in Section 3, however, Fahrbach, Park, and Mizrahi argue that 
most successful past theories have not yet been recognized as false. As a result, pessimists 
cannot say that since most successful past theories turned out to be false, most successful 
present theories will also turn out to be false. 
Second, suppose for the sake of argument that Fahrbach, Park, and Mizrahi are wrong 
about the history of science, i.e., that all or most successful past theories were later 
recognized as false. It is still a dubious hypothesis that successful past and present theories 
are partly and largely true, respectively, for there are alternative hypotheses that both 
successful past and present theories are partly true, and that they are partly and approximately 
true, respectively. As noted earlier, Alai needs to present reasons for thinking that while it is 




Alai states that past and present theories are partly and largely true, respectively. His position 
is built upon the assumptions that all or most past theories were overthrown, and that present 
theories will be overturned, just as past theories were overturned. These two assumptions, 
however, are dubious in light of realists’ critical responses to the pessimistic induction. 
Obviously, Alai did not take these realist responses into account when he formulated his 
position. Moreover, he tries to eat the cake and have it at the same time, i.e., he accuses 
Doppelt and other realists of treating past and present theories differently, while he himself 
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